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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Nicolescu appeals from the district court's appellate decision reversing the
magistrate court's order to suppress evidence and remanding the case for further
proceedings.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The district court adopted the following findings from the magistrate court as the
undisputed facts of this case:
On October 15, 2011 Defendant, Kevin M. Nicolescu (Nicolescu) was
involved in a two vehicle collision at the intersection of Idaho and 16th
streets in Boise, Idaho. Boise City Police Officer Ransom responded to
the scene. Officer Chris Palic of the Boise City Police Department then
arrived on the scene and was directed to speak with Nicolescu.
Nicolescu informed Officer Palic that he had proceeded through a green
light west bound on Idaho Street when the other vehicle northbound on
16th Street apparently ran a red light and collided with his vehicle. While
speaking with Nicolescu, Officer Palic detected a strong odor of an
alcoholic beverage. In addition, Officer Palic noted that Nicolescu had
red, bloodshot and watery eyes. There was no indication of slurred
speech or impaired memory. There were some minor cuts and abrasions
to Nicolescu's face, which Palic assumed were caused by the deployment
of the airbag during the collision. Nicolescu agreed to speak with Palic.
Nicolescu admitted that he had consumed alcohol earlier that evening.
Officer Palic requested Nicolescu submit to a Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus
(HGN) test.
After starting the HGN test, Officer Palic had scored
Nicolescu with 4 of 6 decision points, but did not complete the test due to
an injury to Nicolescu's left eye which had occurred as a result of the
accident. Nicolescu then indicated that his adrenaline was kicking in and
Officer Palic observed Nicolescu's legs shaking and that he was unsteady
on his feet.
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Palic discussed his observations with Officer Larry Moore, who was also
on the scene. Palic explained to Moore that he had observed a strong
odor of alcohol, glassy and bloodshot eyes, that Nicolescu had scored 4 of
6 decision points on the HGN (which would have been a failure) prior to
terminating the test and that Nicolescu admitted he had consumed alcohol
earlier that evening. The watery bloodshot eyes could have been caused
by debris from the airbag deploying in the accident and it is also possible
they resulted from Nicolescu consuming alcohol or even a combination of
both factors. Palic explained that he did not want to perform other FSTs
because Nicolescu was visibly shaken by the accident.
Palic was not aware of any traffic infractions or driving pattern because his
only contact with Nicolescu was after the accident. Palic testified that he
felt that he had enough information to arrest Nicolescu for suspicion of
DUI. Palic testified that based on the totality of the circumstances he told
Officer Moore that he felt Nicolescu was not safe to operate a motor
vehicle. Officer Moore, who had witnessed the discussion between Palic
and Nicolescu, agreed that Palic should continue his investigation to
determine if Nicolescu was safe to operate a motor vehicle or whether he
might be under the influence of alcohol. Paramedics on the scene
examined Nicolescu and noted that he had a scratched cornea[.]
Thereafter, Officer Palic told Nicolescu that he was not going to continue
the HGN test because of the eye injury and because Nicolescu was
shaken up.
Palic then stated: 'What I am going to have you do is blow into a device
(Alcosensor) and we'll just go from there. O.K. and we'll go from there. I
will make my determination from there.'
Nicolescu replied: 'Dude, I'm willing to cooperate however.'
Palic stated: 'It will be a lot easier to do it this way, O.K.'
There was no audible response by Nicolescu and Palic then continued by
explaining that Nicolescu would need to make a tight seal around the pipe
and blow real hard.
Nicolescu submitted to the preliminary breath test [PST] on the AlcoSensor, which is a handheld breath alcohol tester. The Alco-Sensor is not
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certified and is not performance verified. It is used to detect the presence
of alcohol in individuals. The result of the preliminary Alco-Sensor test
was .108 which is over the legal limit. Officer Palic then handcuffed
Nicolescu and placed him in Palic's patrol vehicle to provide further breath
samples. After a 15 minute wait period and an ALS [administrative license
suspension] advisory, using the Lifeloc instrument ... Nicolescu provided
further samples which registered results of .103 and .096. Nicolescu was
then cited-not arrested-for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a
misdemeanor violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. Nicolescu was not
transported to the Ada County Jail to be booked for the DUI, rather he was
transported to St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for treatment of the
eye injury. Memorandum Decision & Order, at 1-4.
(R., pp.162-65 (footnote omitted).)

Nicolescu moved to suppress the breath test evidence arguing that officers
lacked "the necessary probable cause or reasonable suspicion" to require Nicolescu to
submit to evidentiary testing "absent the result of the preliminary breath test," and that
police were not permitted to require Nicolescu to submit to a preliminary breath test.
(R., pp.38-48.) The magistrate court granted Nicolescu's motion (R., pp.73-82), and the

state appealed (R., pp.86-87). Finding that Officer Palic had reasonable suspicion to
conduct a preliminary breath test in conjunction with other field sobriety tests, the district
court reversed the magistrate's order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
(R., pp.162-74.) Nicolescu filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.176-78.)
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ISSUE
Nicolescu states the issues on appeal as:
A.
Whether the District Court erred in finding as a Matter of Law that
the Preliminary Breath Test was not an Evidentiary Test as described
under the Idaho Code;
B.
Whether the District Court erred in finding as a Matter of Law that
Reasonable and Articulable Suspicion was the Legal Standard to
Administer the Preliminary Breath Test; and
C.
Whether the District Court erred in finding as a Matter of Law that
the preliminary breath test result could be used to form the basis of
probable cause to administer further evidentiary testing.
(Appellant's brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Nicolescu failed to show error in the district court's appellate decision
reversing the magistrate court's order suppressing evidence and remanding for further
proceedings?
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ARGUMENT
Nicolescu Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Appellate Decision
Reversing The Magistrate's Order To Suppress Evidence

A.

Introduction
In the magistrate court below, Nicolescu filed a motion to suppress evidence (R.,

pp.38-48), which was granted by that court (R., pp.73-82). The state appealed to the
district court (R., pp.86-87), and the district court reversed (R., pp.162-74). On appeal,
Nicolescu argues that the district court erred in its determination.

(Appellant's brief,

pp.9-30.) Application of the correct legal standards to the facts of this case, however,
shows no error by the district court.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate appellate

capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's decision." State v.
DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 Ct. App. 2008) (citing Losser v.
Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2005)).

When a decision on a motion to

suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that
are

supported

by substantial

evidence,

constitutional principles to those facts.

but freely

reviews

the

application

of

State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d

739,741 (2007).

C.

Officer Palic Could Require Nicolescu To Submit To A Preliminary Breath Test
On Reasonable Suspicion That Nicolescu Was Driving Under The Influence
Below, Nicolescu argued that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when

Officer Palic required him to submit to a preliminary breath test while investigating
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whether Nicolescu was driving under the influence of alcohol.

(R., pp.38-48.)

The

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend. IV. While routine
traffic stops by police officers implicate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed
under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), because a traffic stop is more similar to an
investigative detention than a custodial arrest. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653
(1979); State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003). "An
investigative detention is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which
justify suspicion that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in
criminal activity." Sheldon, 139 Idaho at 983,88 P.3d at 1223 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at
21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
The Court of Appeals has long recognized that "the administration of field
sobriety tests following a traffic stop is but an investigative detention." State v. Ferreira,
133 Idaho 474,480,988 P.2d 700, 706 (Ct. App. 1999). "[F]ield sobriety tests may be
conducted without consent during an otherwise permissible detention, where they are
justified by reason of suspicion of DUI." State v. Buell, 145 Idaho 54,56,175 P.3d 216,
218 (Ct. App. 2008). The reasonableness of the police officer's suspicion is evaluated
based upon th.e totality of the circumstances at the time of the seizure. Cortez, 449 U.S.
at 417-18; State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930,932,829 P.2d 520,522 (1992).
Preliminary breath tests, conducted in the field for the purpose of confirming or
dispelling an officer's reasonable suspicion that a suspect has been driving under the
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influence of alcohol, are directly analogous to other field sobriety tests. See Indiana v.
Lucas, 934 N.E.2d 202, 205 (Ind. App. 2012) ("PBTs are akin to general field sobriety
tests and provide officers with a simple method for making a threshold determination as
to whether a person has consumed alcohol.").

Like other field sobriety tests, a

preliminary breath test may be administered where an officer has reasonable suspicion
that an individual has been driving under the influence of alcohol. Vermont v. Therrien,
38 A.3d 1129, 1131 (Vt. 2011); Minnesota v. Klamar, 823 N.W.2d 687, 696 (Minn. App.
2012) (citing Hager v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 328 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. App. 1986».
See also 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1547(k) (police may require suspect to submit to a
preliminary breath test on reasonable suspicion that the suspect is driving while under
the influence of alcohol); Kan. Stat. Ann. 2010 Supp. 8-1012(b) (same). The relevant
question, therefore, is whether Officer Palic had reasonable suspicion that Nicolescu
was driving under the influence of alcohol in order to require him to submit to a
preliminary breath test.
It is undisputed in this case that Nicolescu was involved in a vehicular accident at
around 2 a.m. when, apparently, another driver ran a red light and collided with him.
(R., pp.163-64.) Responding to that accident, Officer Palic detected the strong odor of
an alcoholic beverage emanating from Nicolescu. (R., p.163.) Nicolescu admitted that
he had consumed alcohol earlier in the evening. (Id.) His eyes were red, bloodshot,
and watery, and his legs were shaking and he was unsteady on his feet. (Id.) Officer
Palic asked Nicolescu to perform an HGN test.

(Id.)

After Nicolescu scored 4 of 6

decision points on the HGN, which was already a failing score, Officer Palic decided to
terminate the test. (R., pp.163-64.)
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Officer Palic terminated the test because, as a result of the accident, Nicolescu's
left cornea was scratched and he was clearly shaken up. (Id.) Officer Palic did not
require Nicolescu to perform other standard field sobriety tests for the same reason.
(ld.) Nicolescu's red, bloodshot, watery eyes and failure on the HGN could have been
caused from intoxication, or from his injuries. Likewise, Nicolescu's inability to perform
standard field sobriety tests, due to his shaking and unsteady legs, could have been
caused from intoxication or from adrenaline due to the accident.

Of course, Officer

Palic was not required to end his investigation due to the existence of these innocent
explanations.

See State v. Rader, 135 Idaho 273, 276, 16 P.3d 949, 952 (Ct. App.

2000) ("the existence of alternative innocent explanations of the circumstances does not
negate the fact that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that a crime might have been
committed").

Rather, under these circumstances, where standard field sobriety tests

and the HGN test were inadequate, using the preliminary breath test was the most
reasonable, non intrusive means of confirming or dispelling Officer Palic's reasonable
suspicion that Nicolescu was driving under the influence of alcohol.
Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, where Nicolescu smelled of
alcohol, admitted he had been drinking, had red, bloodshot, and watery eyes, failed the
HGN test, and could not perform other standard field sobriety tests due to his shaking
and unsteady legs, Officer Palic had reasonable suspicion to require him to submit to a
preliminary breath test. The district court properly reversed the magistrate court's order
excluding evidence of Nicolescu's intoxication and should be affirmed.
Nicolescu argues on appeal that the district court erred by finding that the
preliminary breath test administered in this case was not an evidentiary test under Idaho
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Code § 18-8002(1), asserting, "[fJrom the statutory language, it is clear that an
evidentiary test is any breath, urine or blood test used to determine the concentration of
alcohol in a person, regardless of the admissibility of the results.,,1

(Appellant's brief,

pp.9-14.) If Nicolescu's interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-8002(1) is correct, then his
entire appeal fails.
Under Idaho Code § 18-8002(1), "any person who drives or is in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to
evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol" as long as the test "is administered at
the request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has
been driving" while under the influence.

In State v. Diaz, the Idaho Supreme Court

determined that the implied consent provision of this statute authorizes an officer to
administer such evidentiary tests based on reasonable suspicion that the suspect had
been driving while under the influence. 144 Idaho at 302-03, 160 P.3d at 741-42. In
that case, the Supreme Court determined "reasonable grounds to suspect that Diaz was
driving under the influence" existed due to Diaz's "erratic driving, bloodshot and glassy
eyes, and slurred speech."

~

As set forth above, Officer Palic likewise had reasonable grounds to suspect that
Nicolescu was driving under the influence in this case:

Nicolescu was involved in a

vehicular collision at 2:00 a.m.; Officer Palic could smell the strong odor of alcohol on
Nicolescu; Nicolescu admitted he had consumed alcohol earlier in the evening; he had
1 The district court is in fact correct. The requirements for "evidentiary testing" are set
forth in Idaho Code § 18-8002A(1)(e). Because the preliminary breath test in this case
was not "performed by ... a [method] approved by the Idaho state police," and
standards such as a 15-minute waiting period before administering the test were not
observed (R., pp.164; 172 n.2), it would not qualify as an "evidentiary test" under the
statute. It does, however, qualify as a properly administered field sobriety test.
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red, bloodshot, and watery eyes; Nicolescu had already failed the HGN test before
Officer Palic aborted it; and Nicolescu could not perform other standard field sobriety
tests due to his shaking and unsteady legs. Taken together, these circumstances are
sufficient to support the district court's reasonable suspicion determination.

If the

preliminary breath test is an evidentiary test as Nicolescu asserts, then it was properly
administered under the implied consent provision of Idaho Code § 18-8002(1).
Nicolescu also argues that the district court erred by determining that the results
of the preliminary breath test could be considered among other factors to support
Officer Palic's reasonable suspicion that Nicolescu was driving under the influence and
require him to submit to additional evidentiary testing.

(Appellant's brief, pp.24-29.)

Assuming, as the district court did, that preliminary breath tests do not constitute
evidentiary tests for purposes of Idaho Code § 18-8002(1), a failing score is still good
evidence by which an officer would have reasonable grounds to suspect that a driver is
under the influence of alcohol

Nicolescu has failed to show any reason that an officer

should be prevented from considering the results of a preliminary breath test among
other factors under a totality of the circumstances analysis, regardless of that test's
admissibility at trial.

See State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408, 283 P.3d 722, 725

(2012) ("[I]t is not necessary that police officers rely only on evidence which will be
admissible in court in finding a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.") (citing State v.
Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,813-14,203 P.3d 1203, 1212-13 (2009)).
Moreover, even if Officer Palic could not rely on the results of the preliminary
breath test in determining whether to administer an evidentiary test that would be
admissible at trial, Nicolescu's argument still fails.
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Reasonable and articulable

suspicion is an objective test which does not depend on an officer's subjective beliefs.
Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435, 436, 958 P.2d 592, 593 (1998). As explained above,
under the implied consent provision of Idaho Code § 18-8002(1), when an officer has
"reasonable grounds to believe [aJ person has been driving" while under the influence of
alcohol, he is authorized to administer an evidentiary test of the suspect's blood, breath,
or urine. In this case, Officer Palic had "reasonable grounds to believe" that Nicolescu
had been driving while intoxicated. With or without the results of the preliminary breath
test, Officer Palic was authorized to administer the second evidentiary test based on his
objectively reasonable, articulable suspicion. 2
Nicolescu has failed to show any error by the district court. Preliminary breath
tests are a type of field sobriety test, administrable under the same standards of
reasonable suspicion which govern the administration of all field sobriety tests. Under
the totality of the circumstances of this case, Officer Palic had sufficient reasonable
suspicion to require Nicolescu to submit to a preliminary breath test. The district court
correctly reversed the magistrate court's order excluding evidence of Nicolescu's
intoxication and should be affirmed.

Nicolescu also asserts that probable cause, rather than reasonable suspicion, should
be the standard for administering preliminary breath tests. (Appellant's brief, pp.17 -24.)
His argument fails. First, preliminary breath tests are a type of field sobriety test and, as
in all other field sobriety tests, the reasonable suspicion standard applies to their
administration. Buell, 145 Idaho at 56, 175 P.3d at 218; Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 480,988
P.2d at 706. Second, even if preliminary breath tests are evidentiary tests, then the
implied consent provision of Idaho Code § 18-8002(1) controls and the preliminary
breath test may be administered upon reasonable suspicion that the suspect has been
driving while under the influence. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 302-03, 160 P.3d at 741-42; I.C. §
18-8002(1). Either way, reasonable suspicion is the standard.
2
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's appellate
decision reversing the magistrate's order suppressing evidence and remanding this
case for further proceedings.

DATED this 5th day of November, 2013.

~

Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of November, 2013, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing two copies in the
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
ED GUERRICABEITIA
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, LLP
PO Box 1583
Boise, 10 83701
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